Game-theoretic analysis of the impact of net neutrality on internet service providers’ investments
https://doi.org/10.35854/1998-1627-2026-5-672-684
Abstract
Aim. To assess the effect of net neutrality on internet service providers’ investments.
Objectives. To create a game-theoretic model of the internet service provider market in which content providers are heterogeneous in their value to consumers and in their bargaining power relative to internet service providers; to obtain a conclusion about the effect of net neutrality by comparing the optimal investment decisions of internet service providers under net neutrality and in its absence.
Methods. The author applied methods of game-theoretic modeling and mathematical optimization, including backward induction and the Lagrange multiplier method; the concept of Nash equilibrium was used.
Results. It is established that net neutrality does not affect internet service providers’ investments if a large content provider does not become exclusive in the absence of net neutrality; net neutrality increases the total investment volume of internet service providers when a large content provider becomes exclusive.
Conclusion. The finding that the effect of net neutrality on internet service providers’ investments depends on the share of content providers that would prefer to become exclusive in the absence of net neutrality can help Russian regulators assess the feasibility of preserving net neutrality.
About the Author
Mikhail M. TaipovRussian Federation
Mikhail M. Taipov, Postgraduate Student,
1, Leninskie Gory, Moscow, 119991.
Competing Interests:
The author declares no conflict of interest related to the publication of this article.
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Review
For citations:
Taipov M.M. Game-theoretic analysis of the impact of net neutrality on internet service providers’ investments. Economics and Management. 2026;32(5):672-684. (In Russ.) https://doi.org/10.35854/1998-1627-2026-5-672-684
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