emjumeЭкономика и управлениеEconomics and Management1998-16273033-7984СПбУТУиЭ10.35854/1998-1627-2026-5-672-684emjume-2894Research ArticleНАУЧНЫЕ ИССЛЕДОВАНИЯ МОЛОДЫХ УЧЕНЫХSCIENTIFIC RESEARCH OF YOUNG SCIENTISTSТеоретико-игровой анализ влияния сетевого нейтралитета на инвестиции интернет-провайдеровGame-theoretic analysis of the impact of net neutrality on internet service providers’ investmentshttps://orcid.org/0009-0003-5375-3663ТаиповМихаил МаратовичTaipovMikhail M.

Михаил Маратович Таипов, аспирант,

119991, Москва, Ленинские горы, д. 1.

Mikhail M. Taipov, Postgraduate Student,

1, Leninskie Gory, Moscow, 119991.

mmtaipov@yandex.ruМосковский государственный университет имени М. В. ЛомоносоваLomonosov Moscow State University202605062026325672684Copyright © Таипов М.М., 20262026Таипов М.М.Taipov M.M.Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://emjume.elpub.ru/jour/article/view/2894Цель

Цель. Оценить эффект сетевого нейтралитета на инвестиции интернет-провайдеров.

Задачи

Задачи. Создать теоретико-игровую модель рынка интернет-провайдеров, в которой поставщики контента неоднородны по своей ценности для потребителей и наличию переговорной силы относительно интернет-провайдеров; в процессе сравнения оптимальных решений интернет-провайдеров об инвестициях при сетевом нейтралитете и при его отсутствии получить вывод об эффекте сетевого нейтралитета.

Методология

Методология. Автором применены методы теоретико-игрового моделирования и математической оптимизации, включая метод обратной индукции, метод множителей Лагранжа; использована концепция равновесия Нэша.

Результаты

Результаты. Установлено, что сетевой нейтралитет не влияет на инвестиции интернет-провайдеров в случае, если крупный поставщик не становится эксклюзивным при отсутствии сетевого нейтралитета; увеличивает суммарный объем инвестиций интернет-провайдеров при эксклюзивности крупного поставщика.

Выводы

Выводы. Полученный вывод о том, что эффект сетевого нейтралитета на инвестиции интернет-провайдеров зависит от доли поставщиков контента, которые предпочтут стать эксклюзивными при отсутствии сетевого нейтралитета, может помочь российским регуляторам в оценке целесообразности сохранения сетевого нейтралитета.

Aim

Aim. To assess the effect of net neutrality on internet service providers’ investments.

Objectives

Objectives. To create a game-theoretic model of the internet service provider market in which content providers are heterogeneous in their value to consumers and in their bargaining power relative to internet service providers; to obtain a conclusion about the effect of net neutrality by comparing the optimal investment decisions of internet service providers under net neutrality and in its absence.

Methods

Methods. The author applied methods of game-theoretic modeling and mathematical optimization, including backward induction and the Lagrange multiplier method; the concept of Nash equilibrium was used.

Results

Results. It is established that net neutrality does not affect internet service providers’ investments if a large content provider does not become exclusive in the absence of net neutrality; net neutrality increases the total investment volume of internet service providers when a large content provider becomes exclusive.

Conclusion

Conclusion. The finding that the effect of net neutrality on internet service providers’ investments depends on the share of content providers that would prefer to become exclusive in the absence of net neutrality can help Russian regulators assess the feasibility of preserving net neutrality.

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.